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Abstract
Current security model in Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) predominantly
use symmetric key cryptography. The rapid advancement of Internet technology facilitates
online trading, banking, downloading, emailing using resource-constrained handheld devices
such as personal digital assistants and cell phones. However, these applications require more
security than the present GSM supports. Consequently, a careful design of GSM security using
both symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography would make GSM security more adaptable
in security intensive applications. This paper presents a secure and efficient protocol for GSM
security using identity based cryptography. The salient features of the proposed protocol are
(i) authenticated key exchange; (ii) mutual authentication amongst communicating entities;
and (iii) user anonymity. The security analysis of the protocol shows its strength against some
known threats observed in conventional GSM security.
Keywords: GSM security, Identity-based cryptography, Authentication, Encryption, Mobile
communications.
1 Introduction
Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) [1] has been the most widely used technology in
connecting mobile devices (e.g., Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), cell phones) wirelessly, where
mobile devices remain connected even on the move and irrespective of their geographical locations.
The GSM technology was introduced as an improvement over analog First Generation wireless
systems. Earlier GSM was used to transfer only voice and text conversations, but with the intro-
duction of services like mobile banking, secure billing, we surfing, so on and so forth, there is a
need to update the current GSM security model. As a result, additional security attributes, such
as mutual authentication, dynamic key establishment, non-repudiation are important requirements
for securing these applications. However, to the best of authors’ knowledge, the main challenges in
designing GSM security protocol are i) providing higher level of security while keeping the compu-
tational and communication cost low on resource-constrained mobile devices, and ii) compatibility
issues amongst devices and applications.
The security philosophy of GSM was driven by the concerns to ensure the following: [2].
- Anonymity of subscriber: Subscriber’s identity, which is a unique number IMSI, is not sent
through over-the-air channel in clear, for this a temporary identity TMSI is used through
which network retrieves IMSI. IMSI is always sent through a secure channel.
- Authentication of subscriber: authentication of the subscriber is done through challenge re-
sponse mechanism.
- Confidentiality of user and signaling data: in the current GSM scheme a secret key between
user and network is established to communicate through over-the-air insecure channel which
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ensures confidentiality of user and signaling data.
- One-way authentication: Current GSM security model does not provide mutual authentica-
tion.
- The channel between VLR and HLR is assumed to be a secure private channel.
Having observed the merits and limitations of the GSM network, we think the GSM security model
has to be evolved in such a way that the network should be used not only in voice communications
or text messaging but also it should support adequate security strength for accommodating secure
billing, trading, content up/downloading, etc. This paper proposes a scheme which aims at achieving
the same. It uses ID-based cryptosystem and Elliptic Curve Cryptography, these two techniques
allow us to achieve high level of security at reduced key lengths. In the proposed scheme the resource
constraint mobile device does not indulge in any computationally extensive task, thereby providing
a high level of performance.
1.1 GSM Architecture
There are three main components of GSM architecture:
- The Mobile Station (MS): It consists of mobile wireless equipment (i.e. the hardware) and
the subscriber information. The subscriber information is the IMSI (International Mobile
Subscriber Identity) which is stored in the SIM (Subscriber Identity Module).
- Base Station Subsystem (BSS): It consists of Base Transceiver Station (BTS) and Base Station
Controller (BSC). The BTS contains radio transceivers and engages in radio link protocols
with MS, the BSC controls and manages radio resources of several BTSs. Also BSC is re-
sponsible for radio channel setup, frequency hopping and handovers between two BTSs that
the BSC controls.
- Network Subsystem (NSS): It consists of five entities:
• Mobile Switching Centre (MSC): It provides functionalities like registration, authentica-
tion, location updating and call routing to a roaming subscriber, to the MS.
• Home Location Register (HLR): It contains the current location of the subscriber regis-
tered in the GSM network and manages administrative information about the MS.
• Visitor Location Register (VLR): The VLR is an agent deputed by HLR with some
administrative responsibilities for services to the MS.
• Equipment Identity Register (EIR): It is a database that stores the list identities of all
valid mobile stations in the network.
• Authentication Centre (AuC): It is a protected database containing the shared secret
keys stored in the mobile subscriber’s SIM.
1.2 Paper contributions
The current GSM security model is based on the symmetric key cryptography, which does not
support required security services for security intensive applications such as mobile banking, trad-
ing, emailing, etc. The paper is aimed at securing GSM network using identity-based cryptography.
The proposed protocol does not require any secure/dedicated channel between the BSS and network
servers. As the mobile devices are resource constraint and have limited computing capability, the
protocol has been designed in such a manner that mobile devices do not require to compute costly
public key operation. The protocol provides mutual authentication, anonymity, replay protection,
and mutual key control for establishing session key. After successful authentication between mo-
bile device and authentication server, the transmitted data are being encrypted under a dynamic
transient key established by the MS and VLR/HLR.
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1.3 Paper organization
In section II, we discuss preliminaries that would make the paper self sufficient, followed by related
work. In section III, we present our protocol. In section IV, we analyze the proposed protocol. We
conclude the paper with Section V.
2 Preliminaries and Related Work
In this section we discuss some preliminary concepts that are required for thorough understanding
of the proposed protocol. It includes the basic concepts of Elliptic Curve Cryptography and Bilinear
Pairing. After that we would discuss the related work done in the fields of ‘Authentication in GSM’
as well as ’ID-based cryptosystems’.
Elliptic curve. An elliptic curve E over a field F (in short, E(F )) is a cubic curve [3] with no
repeated roots. The general form of an elliptic curve is Y 2+a1XY +a3Y = X
3+a2X
2+a4X+a5,
where ai ∈ F , i = 1, 2, · · · , 5. The E(F ) contains the set of all points P (x, y) on the curve, such
that x, y are elements of F along with an additional point called point at infinity (O). The set
E(F ) forms an Abelian group under elliptic curve point addition operation with O as the additive
identity. The addition rules are as follows: For all P,Q ∈ E(F ), let Fq be a finite field with order
q and characteristic p.
Point Addition.
1. If P = (x1, y1) 6= O, then −P = (x1,−y1).
2. If P 6= Q and P,Q 6= O, then the line joining P and Q intersects the curve in another point
R.
3. If P = Q and P,Q 6= O, then the line l is the tangent at P and intersects the curve at another
point −R. Then define P +Q = 2P = R.
Scalar Multiplication of a Point. The scalar, n, multiplication of a curve point P is defined as
n-times addition of P , i.e., nP = P + P + · · ·+ P (n-times). There are algorithms [4, 5] for faster
computation of scalar multiplication of a curve point.
2.1 Computational Problems
Let there is a randomized parameter generator algorithm and a polynomial time algorithm that
takes as input a security parameter 1k and outputs the required/resultant parameters.
Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). Let p and q be two prime numbers such that q|(p− 1).
Let g be a random element with order q in Z∗p , and y be a random element generated by g. Then,
for any probabilistic polynomial time algorithm P , the probability that P(p, q, g, y) = x such that
gx = y mod p is a negligible function in k.
Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Given an elliptic curve E(Fq), points
P and Q(=xP ) for P,Q ∈ E(Fq), the ECDLP is to determine the integer x.
Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP). Given (P, aP, bP ) for all a, b ∈ Z∗q , com-
pute abP . The advantage of any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm P in solving CDHP in G1,
is defined as AdvCDH
P,G1
= Pr[P(P, aP, bP, abP ) = 1 for all a, b ∈ Z∗q ]. And the advantage is negligible
in k for all probabilistic polynomial time algorithms.
2.2 Bilinear Pairings
A bilinear pairing [6] is a function that takes as input two group elements and outputs an element of
a multiplicative Abelian group. The Weil pairing and the Tate pairing are the two most commonly
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used bilinear pairings in cryptography. So far, a large number of schemes and protocols have been
proposed using bilinear pairings, and we refer to [7] for various pairing based cryptographic schemes
and protocols. Formally, the bilinear pairing is defined as follows:
Suppose G1 is a cyclic additive group of prime order q, G2 is a cyclic multiplicative group of the
same order and P be a generator of G1. A map eˆ : G1 ×G1 → G2 is called a bilinear pairing if it
satisfies the following properties:
- Bilinearity: eˆ(aP, bQ) = eˆ(P,Q)ab for all P,Q ∈ G1 and a, b ∈ Z
∗
q .
- Non-degeneracy: There exist P,Q ∈ G1 such that eˆ(P,Q) 6= 1.
- Computability: There is an algorithm to compute eˆ(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G1.
In general, G1 is the group of points on an elliptic curve and G2 denotes a multiplicative subgroup
of a finite field. One may refer to [7] for an informative description of various parameters involved
in bilinear pairings and its implementation details.
2.3 Map-to-Point
Map-to-Point (a special hash function) is an algorithm for converting an arbitrary bit string onto
an elliptic curve point. Firstly, the string has to be converted into an integer and then a mapping
is required from that integer onto an elliptic curve point. As our scheme uses this special hash
operation, we discuss a basic algorithm for Map-to-Point [6] as follows.
Let E(Fp) be an elliptic curve defined as y
2 = f(x) and let Fp has order m. Let P ∈ E(Fp) be a
point of prime order q and h : {0, 1}∗ → Fp × {0, 1} be a one-way collision-resistant hash function.
The algorithm works as follows:
1) Given M ∈ {0, 1}∗, Set i = 1
2) Set (x, b) = h(i‖M) ∈ Fp × {0, 1}
3) If f(x) is a quadratic residue in Fp then
– Let y0, y1 ∈ Fp be the two square roots of f(x)
– Set PˆM = (x, yb) such that yb = Max(y0, y1)
4) Compute PM = (m/q)PˆM . Then PM ∈ E(Fp).
5) Otherwise increment i and go to step 2.
2.4 GSM Security
The GSM security [2, 8] is based on A3, A5, and A8 algorithms using a master secret generated
by the NSS and stored at MS and network’s authentication server. A5 is based on combination of
three ’Linear Feedback Shift Registers(LFSR)’. These are initialized with a 64-bit key whose 10-bits
are always zero, therefore the effective key length is 54-bits.
2.4.1 Registration Phase:
During MS registration, AuC registers a 128 bit key Ki and stores it in the SIM of the MS
2.4.2 Authentication Phase
- MS → VLR :<TMSI>
Whenever a MS want to connect to the GSM network it sends the nearest VLR its TMSI.
Since the subscriber is sending TMSI and not IMSI, he remains anonymous.
- VLR → HLR : <IMSI>
If MS is not in roaming then VLR itself knows IMSI but if the MS is on roaming scenario
then VLR has to send the received TMSI to the previous VLR under whom the MS was held.
Upon having IMSI, VLR sends the IMSI to HLR.
- HLR → VLR: <RAND,SRES,Kc >
HLR sends back five distinct authentication triplets to VLR. Each triplet consists of three
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entities, namely, a random number (RAND), a signed response (SRES =A3(RAND, Ki)),
and an encryption key (Kc = A8(RAND, Ki)).
- VLR → MS: <RAND>
VLR selects one triplet to authenticate the MS and sends RAND to the MS.
- MS → VLR : <SRES’>
MS computes SRES’= A3 (RAND,Ki) and K
′
c = A8(RAND,Ki). MS then sends back SRES’
to the VLR
- VLR upon receiving SRES’ compares it with SRES in the authentication triplet. If SRES =
SRES’ then MS is authenticated else VLR terminate the operation.
2.5 Public key cryptography in GSM
GSM security using public key cryptography started back in 1989 with Yacobi and Shimley [9]
proposed a key distribution protocol which is based on Diffie-Hellman [10], but this protocol is
vulnerable to impersonation attack [11]. Bellar and Yacobi [12]proposed a protocol based on El-
Gamal encryption [13], but later this protocol was also proven insecure [14]. Subsequently several
protocols [15], [16], [17], [18] have been proposed securing mobile communications using public key
cryptography.
3 The Proposed Protocol
The proposed protocol uses the fascinating features of identity-based cryptography, where the se-
curity of the protocol is based on Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP) cited in section
II. In 1984, Shamir [19] proposed the first ID based cryptosystems and signature scheme. ID based
cryptosystem has a property that the public key can be derived from an identity that can help us
identify any user uniquely thus this scheme obviates the need of any public key certificates.
The proposed protocol allows both MS and NSS to authenticate each other, then they establish
a transient secret key for securing data to be transmitted in that session. One of the interesting
feature of the proposed protocol is that in every session, MS does only hashing, XORing, and one
scalar multiplication on elliptic curve point, whereas, HLR and VLR computes public key opera-
tions.
The protocol consists of three phases - setup, registration, and authenticated key exchange. The
setup and registration phases are a one-time operation, but the authenticated key exchange phase
is a dynamic operation, as and when demanded. The symbols and notation used in our protocol
are given in Table 1.
3.1 Setup Phase.
HLR chooses a random integer s ∈ [1, p-1], where p is large prime number. Then HLR selects
a master secret key K and generates a public-private key pair (HLRpub, HLRpri) as HLRpri =
K · H(HLRID) and HLRpub = H(HLRID), where HLRpri and K are secret, and HLRpub and
H(·) are made public.
3.2 Registration Phase.
When a new MS wants to register with NSS, the HLR of that NSS generates a key K ′ = K ·
H(IMSI) corresponding to IMSI of the MS. It, then, stores this K ′ in the SIM of the MS and
also stores a copy of K ′ with itself for further verification of the MS.
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Notions Explanations
IMSI International Mobile Subscriber Identity
TMSI Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identity
V LRID V LR’s identity
HLRID HLR’s identity
HLRpub HLR’s public Key
HLRpri HLR’s private Key
H(·) Map-to-point, a special hash function.
MSpub MS’s public key
A → B : m message m is sent from an entity A to B
m1 ⊕m2 Bit-wise XORing of strings m1 and m2
m1‖m2 Concatenation of strings m1 and m2
EX(m) message m is encrypted using the key X
SIGNX(m) message m is signed using the key X
Table 1: Symbols and Notation
3.3 Authenticated Key Exchange Phase.
This phase enables both MS and VLR to authenticate each other and after successful authentication
they establish a transient session key. All the following message transmissions are done over the
public channel. The phase works as follows:
1) MS → VLR : < TMSI >
When MS wants to use services of NSS it sends its TMSI.
2) VLR → MS : < RAND >
Upon receiving MS’s TMSI, VLR sends RAND back to the MS, where RAND is a nonce
used to protect the protocol against replay attacks.
3) MS → VLR : H(K ′′)‖TMSI‖RAND′′.
After receiving RAND, MS generates another nonce RAND′ and computes RAND′′ as
RAND′′ = RAND ⊕ RAND′. Then, the MS calculates K ′′ = K ′ · H(RAND′′) and sends
H(K ′′)‖TMSI‖RAND′′ to VLR.
4) VLR → HLR : EHLRpub(IMSI‖H(K
′′)‖V LRID‖RAND
′′).
VLR, now, obtains IMSI for corresponding TMSI it received from MS. Then VLR creates
a message < IMSI‖H(K ′′)‖V LRID‖RAND > and encrypts it using HLRpub. Here, the
encryption algorithm could use any public key encryption algorithm. However, as we intend
to use identity based cryptography, the identity-based encryption [6] by Boneh and Franklin
finds an application in our protocol.
5) HLR decrypts the message using its private key and gets K ′ corresponding to the IMSI it
received. It then generates K ′′ = K ′ ·H(RAND′′) and checks if calculated H(K ′′) ia same as
the received value. If it does, it authenticates MS. It then authenticates VLR on seeing the
V LRID it received. If either of VLR or MS is not authenticated, the session is terminated.
6) HLR → VLR : SIGNHLRpri{H(IMSI‖K
′′‖V LRID)}, H(IMSI‖K
′′‖V LRID).
HLR sends SIGNHLRpri{H(IMSI‖K
′′‖V LRID)}, H(IMSI‖K
′′‖V LRID) to the VLR. VLR
first verifies the signature, and if the signature is valid then VLR proceeds to next step;
otherwise, terminate the session. Here, the short-signature scheme [20] by Boneh et al. is
applicable for signing the message.
7) VLR → MS: H(IMSI‖K ′′‖V LRID), V LRID).
VLR appends its identity V LRID to the message it received from HLR and relays it to MS.
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8) MS generates H(IMSI‖K ′′‖V LRID). If the computed hashed matches the value which it
received from the VLR, MS authenticates the NSS (both HLR and VLR); otherwise, the
session is terminated.
4 Security Analysis
The proposed protocol has two communication channels - one in between MS and VLR and other
in between VLR and HLR. It is important to note that both channels are public channels, that is,
all transmitted messages are available to the adversary. However, we show that the protocol resists
the following attacks, which are potential threats of any authenticated key exchange protocol.
4.1 Replay Attack
Replay attack is an offensive attack in which an adversary intercepts a session and then replays
some of the intercepted parameters to gain control over a new session. The proposed protocol resists
replay attacks, as two nonces are involved in each session. The MS verifies the freshness of RAND
by seeing its current value and previous value. Typically, if the current value of RAND is greater
than the previous one, then MS proceeds further, else, terminate the communication. It is also
important to note that one of the nonces is never sent over the network. As a result, if adversary
replays the same value of RAND, then K ′′ will be different for different sessions. Therefore, replay
attack is not succeeded in our protocol.
4.2 Mutual Authentication
The protocol provides strong authentication. The communicating entities (MS, VLR, HLR) involved
in a session authenticate each other before they agree on a shared session key. The authentication
process works as follows.
- MS authenticating VLR and HLR. MS sends H(K ′′) and TMSI to VLR. It is the
responsibility of the VLR to obtain correct IMSI for the corresponding TMSI and of the
HLR to obtain the value of K ′ for the received IMSI. These two responsibilities cannot
be done by any other parties other than authentic VLR and HLR. Now, when the MS gets
H(IMSI‖K ′′‖V LRID) from the VLR (which came from the HLR) if the verification of this
hash holds correct then MS can be sure that the K ′′ was correctly computed by the HLR.
Consequently, both VLR and HLR authenticity are confirmed.
- HLR authenticating MS and VLR. HLR when receives
EHLRpub{IMSI‖H(K
′′)‖V LRID‖RAND
′′} then HLR authenticates the VLR by decrypting
it and then checking the value of V LRID and also by verifying the value of IMSI. Further,
HLR authenticates MS by recomputing K ′′ and verifying the H(K ′′) it received.
- VLR authenticating MS and HLR. The authenticity of HLR is achieved by its signature
on H(IMSI‖K ′′‖V LRID) and MS’s authenticity through its TMSI, which should have a
mapping to a valid IMSI stored at VLR’s database.
4.3 Anonymity
The proposed protocol provides anonymity for the mobile entity (MS). The MS can be identified
on the network by the means of a valid IMSI. The IMSI of a MS is not transmitted in public,
instead, MS sends its TMSI over the public channel. Upon receiving TMSI, the VLR maps the
TMSI to a valid IMSI. If a valid IMSI corresponding to TMSI is found in VLR’s database then
VLR sends the IMSI along with other parameter to HLR in an encrypted manner using HLR’s
public key, so that HLR decrypts it using his private key and get the MS’s IMSI. As a result,
MS’s identity is not disclosed any other party except VLR and HLR.
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4.4 Impersonation Attacks
An adversary cannot impersonate MS and HLR for the following reasons:
- MS computes H(K ′′)‖TMSI‖RAND that requires to compute K ′′, which in turn requires the
secret key K ′ known to MS.
- VLR and HLR secrecy is based on public key encryption.
4.5 Mutual Key Control
For each session, the protocol generates a new session key K ′′ which is computed as
K ′′ = RAND′′ ·K ′, where RAND′′ = RAND ⊕ RAND′. Here K ′ is generated by the HLR and
is stored in the MS.
RAND is generated by the VLR, and RAND′ is generated by the MS.
Therefore, in computation of a session key, the protocol requires components from all the three
participating entities. In other words, no one is allowed to be biased in a particular session key,
and thus, the protocol provides mutual key control.
4.6 Freshness of Session Key
The protocol run resists the freshness property of the session if the intruder cannot guess a fresh
session key with a non-negligible probability. In other words, at the end of the protocol run the
intruder should not be able to distinguish a fresh session key, say sk, from a randomly chosen key
from a pool of session keys issued in some of the previous sessions. In order to illustrate the protocol
strength against freshness of the session key, we consider the following challenger-intruder game,
proposed in [21].
Intruder general query: The intruder makes query to our protocol, for some of the previously issued
session keys and obtains a set S of session keys.
Intruder special query: The intruder makes a special query to our protocol for a fresh session key
and obtains skfh as the fresh session key.
Challenger challenge: The challenger asks the intruder to answer the freshness of a session key skch
by running the protocol or choosing a sample from S. In other words, the query is generated in
flipping a fair coin b ∈ {0, 1} and returning skch if b = 0, or else a random sample from S if b = 1.
Intruder guess: The intruder now guesses b. Let intruder’s guess is result ∈ {0, 1}. The advantage
that the intruder correctly identifies whether he was given the fresh session key or just a sample
from S is max{0, Pr[result] - 1
2
}. The protocol run resists the freshness property of the session key
if the intruder cannot guess session key’s freshness with a non-negligible probability.
5 Conclusion
We proposed a secure and efficient protocol for GSM security using identity based cryptography.
The proposed protocol does not require any secure/dedicated channel between the BSS and network
servers. The protocol does not consume much computational resource on mobile device and pro-
vides mutual authentication, anonymity, replay protection, and mutual key control for establishing
session key. After successful authentication between mobile device and authentication server, the
communicating principals establish a session key by which transmitted data is being protected.
The work could be extended in making the protocol secure against denial-of-service and providing
forward secrecy.
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